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The paper is intended to provide evidence of the effect audit committee meeting, attendance meeting, size, and 
appointment on earnings management. The population of the paper are public non financial companies from 2016 
to 2018. The paper uses 85 samples selected through purposive sampling method, hence amounting to 255 firm year. 
The result indicates that audit committee size statisticall influenced earnings management. Audit committee 
meeting, attendance meeting, and appointment have no influence toward earnings management. Audit committee 
size positively influenced earnings management by ineffeciency while they doing their task to monitor mangement 
when it is too large. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial statement has been primary indicator for investor or owner to evaluate 
the performance of the company. They will measure how many return they will get and 
whether the company can maximize their wealth. Nowadays, almost all companies in the 
world have separate management and owner that lead to the appeareance of Agency 
Theory. Meanwhile, management use this chance to manipulate or manage their earnings 
when they have not reached principal’s goals at the end of period. By doing that, 
management also can get incentives or bonus if they reach the goals. On the other hand, 
management may make their earnings as low as possible or even loss with a big amount 
that is known as Big Bath. So, in the next period the management can show better 
performance and avoid replacement with another professional. 
Based on that explanation, financial statements has not reflect the real condition of 
the company that will affect the wrong decision taken by the users. To minimize or avoid 
this action, corporate governance through the existence of audit committee is one of the 
solution. A corporate governance system is the combination of mechanisms which ensure 
that the management runs the firm for the benefit of one or several stakeholders (Susanto 
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2013). Audit committee will review the company’s process of assessing the risk of 
fraudulent reporting and also the program that established by management to monitor 
compliance with the code of corporate conduct. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) required all public companies to establish audit committees, first supported the 
concept of the Audit Committee around 1940 in response to requests from non-executive 
directors of several issuers who requested an Audit Committee consisting of non-executive 
directors on duty to nominate and select external auditors and determine parameters in 
the engagement with the external auditor. In Indonesia, the existence of Audit Committee 
started since 2001 through a legal letter from OJK (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) No: 
55/PJOK.04/2015 which contain the need of the Audit Committee to be held by each 
company. The existence of an audit committee in accordance with its function to oversee 
management. The audit committee is expected to minimize opportunistic earnings 
management. The results of the research on the effect of the audit committee on earnings 
management have an effect (Qamhan et al. 2018) and have no effect (Firnanti 2017). 
In regards to those reasons above, some research problem are formulated about 
whether audit committee meeting, attendance meeting, size, and appointment affect the 
earnings management. Hence, the objective of the paper is to gain better knowledge and 
insights about whether audit committee meeting, attendance meeting, size, and 
appointment affect the earnings management. This research is comprised of 
introduction, research method, analysis and discussions, and closing. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Audit Committe Meeting 
The existence of audit committee is important in overseeing and monitoring the 
financial reporting process, so the output will be usefull for the users to take right decision. 
An effective audit committee will reduce financial reporting fraud, meanwhile the 
effectiveness is seen from the audit committee activity. Menon and Williams (1994) 
explained one of the approaches to measure the effectiveness of audit committee is by 
looking from number of their meetings. Previous reseacrh done by González and García-
Meca (2013) and Soliman and Ragab (2014) which found that audit committee meeting has 
negative influence on earnings management. However, Lin et al. (2006), Hamdan et al. 
(2012) and Prastiti and Meiranto (2013) found different result that audit committee meeting 
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has no influence on earnings management. In the other hand, positive influence on 
earnings management found by Susanto and Pradipta (2016). 
H1: Audit committe meeting has influence on earnings management. 
 
2.2. Attendance Audit Committe Meeting 
 Number of meeting that held by audit committee is not enough to analyze the 
effectiveness of audit committee in mitigating earnings management. But also with the 
member who attend the meeting to analyze the diligence of audit committee member to 
monitor the management and the effectiveness of the meetings (Qamhan et al. 2018). 
Previous research done by Qamhan et al. (2018) found that attendance audit committee 
meeting has negative impact on earnings management. 
H2: Attendance audit committee meeting has influence on earnings management. 
 
2.3. Audit Committee Size 
 Audit committee play an important role in the company to oversee and monitor 
the financial reporting process, then audit committee must be effective in doing their task. 
One of the indicator to assses how effective the audit committe is by their size which 
Sarbanex-Oxley Act 2002 recommend that audit committee should have at least three 
members. Lin et al. (2006) found that there is negative influence between audit committee 
size and earnings management. However, Asitalia and Trisnawati (2017) and Firnanti 
(2017) found no influence of audit committee size on earnings management. In the other 
hand, Rahman and Ali (2006) and Asward and Lina (2015) showed that earnings 
management is positively related to the audit committee size. 
H3: Audit committee size has influence on earnings management. 
 
2.4. Appointment Audit Committee 
The number of audit committee is the most disputed characteristic of audit 
committee. The appointment new member of audit committe will affect on the stability, 
performance and role of the committee in overseeing and monitoring the financial 
reporting process. Previous research done by Qamhan et al. (2018) found that appointment 
audit committee has positive impact on earnings management. 
H4: Appointment audit committee has influence on earnings management. 
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2.5. Audit Quality 
The presence of external auditor is to ensure that the financial statements has been 
presented fairly and free from material misstatement by gathering an appropriate and 
sufficient evidence and conduct the audit procedure. The high quality auditor are more 
likely to detect questionable accounting practices and material error than low quality 
auditor. They are better to question or negotiate with clients who attempt to adopt 
aggressive accounting procedures than low quality auditor. Previous research done by 
Craswell et al. (1995) found that the audit quality has negative impact on earnings 
management. Meanwhile, Alexander and Hengky (2017), Arifin and Destriana (2018) and 
Florencia and Susanty (2019) showed that there is no influence of audit quality on earnings 
management.  
 
2.6. Managerial Ownership 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) found evidence that managerial ownership succeeded 
for reducing agency problems from managers by aligning the interests of managers with 
shareholders. This research found that manager interests with external shareholder can be 
held together if the share ownership by the manager is enlarged so the managers won't 
manipulate on their behalf. Farida et al. (2010) found that the managerial ownership has 
negative influence on earnings management. In contrast with Asward and Lina (2015) 
found that the relation between earnings management and managerial ownership is 
positive. However, Napitupulu (2012), Nugraheni et al. (2015), Arifin and Destriana (2018) 
and Susanto (2013) found that there is no influence between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. 
 
2.7. Firm Size 
 Different views exist regarding to the influence of firm size on earnings 
management. One of them refers to the internal control. The large firms have more 
effective internal control than the small firms, then large the firm size less the earnings 
management. Previous research done by Jao and Pagalung (2011), González and García-
Meca (2013), Susanto (2016), and Susanto, Pradipta, & Cecilia (2019) found that firm size 
has negative influence on earnings managment. However, Arifin and Destriana (2018) and 
Florencia and Susanty (2019) showed that firm size has no influence on earnings 
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management. In the other hand, Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) found that firm size has 
positive impact on earnings management. 
 
2.8. Leverage 
Positive accounting theory highlights some basic incentives for earnings 
management, one of which is debt agreements. As such, this is related to corporate 
leverage which shows the possible relationship between debt covenants and earnings 
management (Lazzem and Jilani 2018). Previous research done by Beatty and Weber 
(2003), Napitupulu (2012), Abbadi (2016), and Susanto, Pirzada, & Adrianne (2019) found  
that leverage has positive impact on earnings management. Meanwhile, Asitalia and 
Trisnawati (2017) and Guna and Herawaty (2010) found that leverage has negative impact 
on earnings management. In the other hand, research done by Ardison et al. (2012) found 
that leverage has no impact on earnings management. 
 
2.9. Profitabiity 
Kapoor and Goel (2017) and Susanto (2013) showed return on asset has no 
influence on earnings management. Meanwhile, research by Amertha (2013), Alexander 
and Hengky (2017), Yunietha and Palupi (2017), and Susanto, Pradipta, & Cecilia (2019) 
showed that profitability has positively influence earnings management. 
 
2.10.  Operating Cash Flow 
Operating cash flow is one indicator for companies to predict their performance 
(Fairfield et al. 2003). To hide the company's bad performance, management practices 
earnings management in financial statements and manages operating cash flow to show 
good performance. The aim is to cover low operating cash flow and thus to show that the 
company's performance is good for attracting more investors and creditors. Zeller and 
Stanko (2000), Yoon and Miller (2002), Yuliana and Trisnawati (2015) found that operating 
cash flow has a negative impact on earnings management. 
 
2.11. Sales Growth 
 Firms with low growth of sales may have intention to manage their earnings in 
order to make their financial statement looks good and attract more investor. Then, 
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previous research done by González and García-Meca (2013) and Yunietha and Palupi 
(2017) found that sales growth has positive impact on earnings management. Conversely, 
Abbadi et al. (2016) found that sales growth has negative impact on earnings management. 




The object of the paper will be taken from all public non financial companies from the year 
of 2016 to 2018 (three years). The samples used are 85 listed non financial companies, hence 
amounting to a total of 255 data to be used.  
 
Table 1. Sample Seletion Procedure 
Criteria Firms Data 
Public non financial firms from the year 2015 to 
2018 426 1278 
Public non financial firms which do not 
consistently 31 December (18) (54) 
Public non financial firms which do not 
consistently use IDR currency (77) (231) 
Public non financial firm which do not 
generates net income (131) (393) 
Public non financial firm which do not have 
managerial ownership (83) (249) 
Public non financial firm which do not disclose 
attendance audit committee members (30) (90) 
Number of sample firms 87 261 
Data Outlier (2) (6) 
Total 85 255 
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The measurement of earnings management adapted by previous research 
(Nugraheni et al. 2015). Total accruals are different between net income before 
extraordinary items and operating cash flow. Discretionary accruals (DAC) are the 















𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡total accruals in year t, 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 previous year total assets, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡revenue in year t less 
revenue in previous year, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡net receivables in year t less net receivables in previous 
year, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡gross property, plant, and equipment in year t. Meetings (ACMET) is measured 
by the number of meetings held by the audit committee (Qamhan et al. 2018). Attendance 
meeting (ACATT) is measured by the proportion of members attendance at meetings 
(Qamhan et al. 2018). Size (ACSIZ) is measured by the total number of members (Qamhan 
et al. 2018). Appointment (APACC) is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 
of either 1 for the occurrence of appointment of members or 0 otherwise. Audit Quality 
(BIG4) is measured dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if company is audited by Big 
4 audit firms, or 0 otherwise (Qamhan et al. 2018).  
Managerial ownership (MAOWN) is the proportion of the company’s shares 
owned by the management (Nugraheni et al. (2015). Firm size (FSIZE) is measured by 
natural logarithm of total assets (Qamhan et al. 2018). Leverage (LEVER) is the ratio of 
book value of all long term debt to total asset (Qamhan et al. 2018).  Profitability (ROA) 
show how the company able to generates income. Based on Qamhan et al. (2018), it is 
calculated by the ratio of  net income to total assets. Operating cash flow (OCF) show how 
the company using cash for their operating activities. Based on Qamhan et al. (2018), it is 
calculated by the ratio of cash flow from operating activities to beginning total assets. Sales 
growth (SALGR) is measured by calculated the difference of sales in certain year divided 
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4. RESEARCH RESULT 
The descriptive statistics results of this research is summarized as in the 
following Table 2: 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Var. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
DAC -0.23617 0.34104 -0.0010653 0.07439785 
ACMET 2 59 8.73 8.403 
ACATT (%) 50 100 93.25 9.239 
ACSIZ 2 6 3.17 0.524 
APACC 0 1 0.30 0.460 
BIG4 0 1 0.44 0.497 
MAOWN 0.000000 0.846872 0.06092029 0.135565492 
FSIZE 25.640461 33.473728 29.38664063 1.590806960 
LEVER 0.000111 0.551634 0.15242575 0.116587125 
ROA 0.000026 0.466601 0.06662284 0.068385209 
OCF -0.273543 0.650860 0.07767369 0.112706126 
SALGR -.513054 1.106197 0.11746377 0.218065540 
Source: Output SPSS 
 
The t-test results of this research is summarized as the following Table 3: 
Table 3. t-Test Result 
Variable B Siginificance 
ACMET 0.000 0.314 
ACATT -1.158E-5 0.949 
ACSIZ 0.012 0.002 
APACC 0.001 0.750 
BIG4 -0.002 0.704 
MAOWN 0.036 0.004 
FSIZE -0.004 0.005 
LEVER 0.040 0.008 
ROA 1.083 0.000 
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Variable B Siginificance 
OCF -0.896 0.000 
SALGR 0.017 0.027 
Source: Output SPSS 
 
Audit committee meeting has no significant influence on earnings management. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee BRC neglected the number of meetings of that committee 
because they did not find any absolute impact between number of meetings on the 
improvement of financial reports quality (Hamdan et al. 2012). This also happen because 
the number of meetings that held by audit committe just to fulfill the requirement that 
ruled out by regulator (Prastiti and Meiranto 2013). 
Attendance audit committee meeting has no significant influence on earnings 
management. This is consistent with Prastiti and Meiranto (2013) that the meetings only is 
mandatory to fulfill the requirement, thereby audit commitee can not perform their task 
efficiently.  
Audit committee size has significant influence on earnings management. The 
coefficient of audit committee size is 0.012 and can be explained as if the audit committee 
size is higher, the earnings management will be higher. This is consistent with Asward and 
Lina (2015) that suggest larger size of audit committee will cause ineffeciency while they 
doing their task because factor of communication. 
Appointment audit committee has no significant impact on earnings management. 
This is based on a notion that appointment of audit committee by company might be just 
to fulfill the requirement or to comply with the regulation, but not to create good corporate 
governance to mitigate earnings management (Asward and Lina 2015). 
Adit quality has no significant impact on earnings management. In line with the 
Alexander and Hengky (2017), whether the company is audited by big four audit firm or 
not, earnings management may still occur because the company has a desire to make the 
financial performance looks good for potential investor. 
Managerial ownership has significant impact on earnings management. The 
coefficient of managerial ownersip is 0.036 and can be explained as if managerial 
ownership is higher, the earnings management will be higher. This is consistent with 
 
 
73 Substansi: Sumber Artikel Akuntansi, Auditing, dan Keuangan Vokasi, | Vol. 4 No. 1, 2020  
 
 
Asward and Lina (2015) that manager has self interest that is return from their ownership. 
Those, manager has probability to manipulate company’s earnings to maximize their 
wealth by level of ownership which give them strong position to do control of the 
company. In case, manager have more information regarding the company, so external 
shareholder will experience difficulty in controlling manager actions. 
Firm size has significant impact on earnings management. The coefficient of firm 
size is -0.004 and can be explained as if firm size is higher, the earnings management will 
be lower. This is consistent with Susanto (2016) and Susanto, Pradipta, & Cecilia (2019) 
that large companies tend to rarely perform earnings management because they already 
have a lot of capital that can be met from inside. This result also consistent with González 
and García-Meca (2013) that suggest larger companies are expected to have more 
sophisticated control systems, skilled advisers and are subject to increased monitoring by 
investors and analysts. 
Leverage has significant impact on earnings management. The coefficient of 
leverage is 0.040 and can be explained as if leverage is higher, the earnings management 
will be higher. This is consistent with Abbadi (2016) and Susanto, Pirzada, & Adrianne 
(2019) suggests that leveraged firms tend to manipulate earnings and distort their financial 
statements to maintain a margin of safety to the creditors and to avoid debt covenant 
violation. 
Profitability has significant impact on earnings management. The coefficient of 
profitability is 1.083 and can be explained as if profitability is higher, the earnings 
management will be higher. Amertha (2013) showed that earnings management done to 
make the performance of the companies look better which results in managers getting a 
bigger bonus. Another reason from Yunietha and Palupi (2017) and Susanto, Pradipta, & 
Cecilia (2019) that the higher the profitability, the higher tax will be charged to the 
company. Then, company will tend to do earnings management to reduce tax charges. 
Operating cash flow has significant impact on earnings management. The 
coefficient of operating cash flow is -0.896 and can be explained as if operating cash flow 
is lower, the earnings management will be higher. Yuliana and Trisnawati (2015) showed 
that the smaller cash inflow to the entity, the bigger management intention to do the 
earnings management so that financial statement or firm performance looks good in the 
eyes of investor. 
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Sales growth has significant impact on earnings management. The coefficient of 
sales growth is 0.017 and can be explained as if sales growth is higher, the earnings 
management will be higher. Yunietha and Palupi (2017) found that if the company has 




Conclusion of the research that audit committee size, managerial ownership, firm 
size, leverage, profitability, operating cash flow and sales growth influenced earnings 
management, meanwhile audit committee meeting, attendance meeting, appointment and 
audit quality do not influenced earnings management. Limitation of the research is 
population is relatively small, which only uses non financial companies for 3 years. 
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